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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEE, WHEN PAID A
SUBSTANTIAL TRAVEL ALLOWANCE, IS COVERED BY WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION WHILE TRAVELING OUTSIDE CONTROL
OF EMPLOYER TO A DISTANT JOB SITE. Zenith National Ins.
Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (Cal. 1967).
The plaintiff, Lawrence De Carmo, was employed as a bricklayer
by the Smiley Steel Construction Company at the job site 130 miles
from his home. Residing near the job site during the week, De
Carmo usually returned home on the weekends, either driving his
own car or riding with one of his co-workers. The employer had no
control over the employee's method of transportation or over the
routes taken. On the weekend of June 20, 1965, De Carmo's car had
broken down, so his superintendent arranged a ride for him with two
co-workers. On this journey from his home to the job site the accident
occurred in which De Carmo was injured and for which he claimed
Workmen's Compensation.'
In determining the applicant's claim, the district court of appeal
noted the following factors: (1) De Carmo's "time on the job" began
when he arrived at the job site; and (2) in addition to his hourly
wage, he was paid a per diem subsistence allowance of $10, which
amounted to an incentive pay for out of town workers to cover their
living and travel expenses. The employees were not paid this al-
lowance for Saturdays or Sundays, nor was there any evidence that the
amount bore a relation to their actual expenses. The court further
found that De Carmo was not required to account for this allowance.
On review to the California Supreme Court, held, award affirmed:
An employee who receives a substantial travel allowance, as an
inducement to accept employment at a distant job site, may recover
under Workmen's Compensation for injuries sustained while travel-
ing to and from work. Zenith National Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeals Board, 66 Adv. Cal. 996, 428 P.2d 606, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (1967).
1 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3753 (West 1955).
The person entitled to compensation may, irrespective of any insurance
or other contract, except as otherwise provided in this division, recover such
compensation directly from the employer. In addition thereto, he may enforce
in his own name, in the manner provided by this division the liability of any
insurer either by making the insurer a party to the original application or by
filing a separate application for any portion of such compensation.
In this particular case Zenith National Insurance, the employer's insurer and the
Smiley Steel Construction Co., the employer, appealed the award by the Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board to the district court of appeal. Both De Carmo and the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board were named as respondents in the action.
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For an injury to be compensable under workmen's compensation
law, it must have arisen out of and in the course of employment; 2
thus if an employee is injured while going to or returning from work,
he is generally precluded from seeking redress under workmen's
compensation law.8 This rule is premised upon the theory that
ordinarily the employment relationship is suspended from the time
the employee leaves his work to go home until the time he resumes
his work.
One of the first California cases to recognize this rule was Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.4 In
that case the court held that the hazards encountered by an employee
while going to or returning from work were not incident' to his em-
ployment but, rather, were the same hazards confronting the general
public every day.
However, this rule has not remained without exception; and the
California courts, in applying this exception, have used two ap-
proaches. The first approach is to find the employment relationship in
existence at the time of the accident by virtue of an agreement which
extends the relationship during the period of going to and coming
from work. Courts utilizing the second approach adjudge the em-
ployment relationship to be in existence during this period because,
first, the transportation to and from work is furnished by the employer
as an incident of employment and, second, the employer retains
control over the employee during this period.
Illustrative of the first approach are the decisions in Breland v.
Taylor,0 and Kobe v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.7 In granting re-
2 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1955) (requiring that for liability to exist against
an employer for an injured employee, the injury must have arisen "out of and in the
course of the employment").
3 55 CAL. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 83 (1960). "The general rule is
that injuries sustained by an employee while he is going to or returning from work are
not compensable under the workmen's compensation law."
4 173 Cal. 313, 159 P. 1041 (1916) (an employee aboard a fishing tug, while
seeking to return to his vessel after going ashore, fell into the bay between two boats
and drowned).
5 The term "incident" is used to mean something that is connected with or in-
herent in the particular thing.
6 52 Cal. App. 2d 415, 126 P.2d 455 (1942) (Pennsylvania employer sent his
employee to California where the employee was injured in an auto accident on the way
to the job site from his California "home").
7 35 Cal. 2d 33, 215 P.2d 736 (1950). The employer paid his employees an addi-
tional hour's pay in pursuance to a union contract which required him to pay travel
time to employees who traveled back and forth each day to jobs over 15 miles distant
from the employer's place of business. The employee was injured while traveling to a
roofing job in a town over 15 miles from the employer's place of business.
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covery to injured employees, agreements were found which extended
the employment relationship to include the intervals of going to and
coming from work. By drawing an inference from the fact that the
employer had paid the employee's transportation expenses, the
Breland court found an implied agreement between the parties which
incorporated the transportation time in the hours of employment.
Similarly, in Kobe, it was held that where the employer compensates
the employee for the time consumed in traveling to and from work,
it may be inferred that there is an agreement that the employment
relationship continued during that period.
In developing the other approach, California courts have also
found that where the employee is using transportation furnished by
the employer, and is under the control of the employer during the
period of going and coming, the employment relationship is in ex-
istence. Dominguez v. Pendola8 allowed recovery for an injury sus-
tained by an employee while being conveyed to work in the employer's
vehicle. Here transportation was furnished by the employer as an
incident of the employment. The court reasoned that when the
employee entered a vehicle provided by his employer for the purpose
of transporting him to the place of employment, he entered the
vehicle and was exposed to the dangers of travel, not as a member of
the public but as an employee. Since the transportation was supplied
by the employer, the risk involved was incident to the employment;
consequently, the employee's injury arose "out of and in the course of
employment." Thus it can be implied that the employment relation-
ship was in existence at the time of the accident.
The basic exception arising from Dominguez-that injuries re-
ceived by an employee while using employer furnished and controlled
transportation in commuting to work are compensable-was followed
in Trussless Roof Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.9 There, an
employee, who had been injured while using transportation furnished
and controlled by the employer during the period of going and
coming, was allowed recovery. The employer had furnished the trans-
portation as an incident of employment. However, it was argued that
8 46 Cal. App. 220, 188 P. 1025 (1920) (employee was injured when he was
thrown from the bed of a truck supplied by his employer to transport employees to
and from their homes to the reservoir where they 'were employed).
9 119 Cal. App. 91, 6 P.2d 254 (1931). The employees were injured in an auto
accident. The car they were in was driven by a co-worker who was reimbursed by the
employer for transporting the other employees. The employer had agreed to supply
transportation to employees who lived beyond a certain distance.
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because the vehicle used had not been the employer's, no control was
retained over the employee during this period. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court stated that the vehicle need not be the employer's for
control to exist, and that the case came within the purview of the
Dominguez exception to the going and coming rule.
While in California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n,10 there was no express agreement to furnish
transportation, the court implied such an agreement because a car
had been purchased and used by the employer to transport the em-
ployees. This agreement arose from the conduct of the parties which
had indicated that the employment relationship was still in existence.
However, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n,11 recovery was denied, where an employee had been in-
jured while driving from his residence to his job site, because the
employer had not had control over the means of applicant's trans-
portation; rather, he simply paid what the employee's bus fare would
have been. The payment of travel expenses alone, in this case, was
not sufficient since the court stressed the requirement of employer
control in finding that the transportation was in the course of employ-
ment.
While all of these cases allowed recovery because the employment
relationship continued during the period of going and coming, the
actual foundation for this continued relationship is based on the fact
that the employer retained control during this period. This was
dearly evident in Westinghouse, where the absence of control pre-
vented recovery. In the previous cases granting recovery, there was
either furnished and controlled transportation by the employer or an
agreement that the employment relationship was to be in existence
during the period of going and coming, in which case the employee
was, in essence, under the control of the employer. In Zenith,1 2 it was
this very aspect of control, or rather the lack of it by the employer at
the time of the accident, that the district court stressed in denying
10 21 Cal. 2d 461, 132 P.2d 815 (1942).
11 239 Cal. App. 2d 533, 48 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1966).
12 Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 54 Cal. Rptr.
696 (D.C.A. 1966). The court felt that there was no rational basis for inferring that
an employer had agreed that the employment relationship shall continue during weekend
travel to and from a remote job site, from the fact that the employer pays a sum in
addition to wages whether that sum is referred to as "subsistence," "bonus," "incentive"
or "living and travel costs," where the employer retains no right of control of the
activities of the employee and payment was not in discharge of an obligation to furnish
transportation.
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compensation for the applicant's injuries. Yet it was this requirement
of control which the California Supreme Court discarded in affirm-
ing the award and allowing compensation for the applicant's in-
juries.'3
The court set a new guideline for determining whether the injuries,
sustained by an employee while traveling to or from work, are
recoverable under Workmen's Compensation. This guideline resulted
from the court's interpretation of the exception to the "going and
coming" rule. It was held that the exception should not be limited
only to situations in which there is some control by the employer over
the employee during this period, but should be expanded to include
situations in which: (1) extended cross-country travel is necessary
to reach the job site; 14 and (2) the size of the travel allowance paid
is a substantial inducement to accept employment. In establishing
these criteria absent the requirement of control, the court relies
heavily on Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,'" where the Supreme
Court of the United States held it erroneous to stress that before an
injury arises out of and in the course of employment, the employer
must have control over the acts and movements of the employee dur-
ing the period of commuting to or from work. Yet in this case, the
payment of the transportation costs was part of the employer's con-
tractual obligation with the employee, and the payment of these costs
alone without this obligation by the employer, might not have been
enough to award recovery." It is noteworthy that the California
Supreme Court, while relying heavily on Cardillo in deciding Zenith,
did not mention Cardillo's employer's obligation. Instead, the court
seizes on Cardillo as a basis for the requirement that an extended
distance must be involved. Further, the court sought to distinguish
Westinghouse7 on this ground.
Support for the Zenith court's decision to discard control as a
13 66 Adv. Cal. 996, 428 P.2d 606, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967).
14 The distance referred to here is the overall distance to the job site from the
employee's home and not the distance the employee is from his home or the job site
at the time of the accident.
15 330 U.S. 469 (1947). The employee was employed by a company whose place of
business was in Washington, D.C., and whose job site was in Quantico, Virginia. A
fixed sum was added per day to employee's pay as a travel expense. The transporta-
tion was actually provided by a car pool of the employees in which the employer
acquiesced, but over which he had no control.
16 33 IowA L. REv. 177-80 (1947) (the author suggests that emphasis in Cardillo
was placed upon the obligation of the employer to furnish tranasportation).
17 239 Cal. App. 2d 533, 48 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1966) (the court felt that this case
could have been decided on the basis that a local commute was involved and that the
employer gave the employee only a nominal allowance for carfare).
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determining factor, and to establish a further basis for recovery, can
be found in various jurisdictions.' 8 Although the court in its opinion
relies heavily on Cardillo, the case of Frick v. Rouse'9 would give
substantial support for the Zenith decision. In Frick, a construction
worker on a job site, which was located a considerable distance from
his home, was killed while traveling to work after spending a weekend
at home. He had been paid an additional amount as travel subsistence
while working away from home. The New York court held that the
travel was incident to the employment and was certainly contem-
plated. Moreover, it was determined that the additional pay amounted
to an inducement and an incentive, so that the death arose out of and
in the course of employment and, was thus compensable. In this case
there were present the same, factors that the California court used in
deciding Zenith: distance, substantial payment, and inducement.
Apparently, the California Supreme Court, in applying the judicial
exception to the "going and coming rule," has in essence rejected the
arbitrary and unfair requirement of employer control. In its place, it
has instituted a more realistic test as to whether the injury arose out
of and in the course of employment. Certainly, if the employee is
controlled by the employer during this period, he should be con-
sidered in the course of employment. But the contention is that there
are situations, as in Zenith, where the employer has no actual control
over the employee during the "going and coming" period, and yet
the journey to and from work should be considered part of the em-
ployment. This type of situation arises: (1) Where the journey to the
employment site is a considerable distance, so that the employee is
exposed to a greater risk than the ordinary man in his travel to work;
and (2) where the employer himself has recognized this distance,
and because of it, has induced the employee to take the employment
by giving him a substantial amount of additional pay. A sound con-
clusion is that, in these circumstances, the employee should be con-
18 58 AM. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 217 (1948). While control should be
considered, it should not be decisive in determining whether an injury received while
going to or returning from work is one arising out of and in the course of employment.
See Neville v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 248 App. Div. 1994, 135 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954).
Applicant was allowed to recover where he was assigned to a job outside the city and
his employer paid transportation charges in returning to the city for the weekend.
Applicant drove his own car. The court held that under the terms of applicant's employ-
ment his job site created a necessity for travel and hence was in the course of employ-
ment. See also Pace v. Laurel Auto Parts, Inc., 238 Miss. 421, 118 So. 2d 871 (1960)
(employee on a remote job site was paid an additional amount to cover transportation
costs and he was allowed recovery for an injury sustained while driving to work).
19 19 App. Div. 2d 685, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1963) cited in Zenith, 66 Adv. Cal. at
1002, 428 P.2d at 610, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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sidered in the course of his employment from the time the journey
begins, since the particular conditions of the employment have made
the travel an incident of the employment.
JOHN W. DRSCOLL
